The aim of the study is to examine the effect of diversity in the board of directors on the performance of the listed Italian financial institutions. The sample is a data set of 177 firm-year observations covering 2011 to 2014. The performance of the firm is measured by Tobin's Q while board diversity is analysed considering the percentage of female and foreign directors on the board (or their conjoint presence as a proxy of overall demographic diversity) and task-diversity is measured by board interlocking directorship and busy directors. Findings suggest that female directors have no effect on firm performance. Foreign directors and interlocking directorship have, instead, a positive statistically significant relationship with performance while we find a negative statistically significant relationship between busy directors and performance. When we consider the overall demographic diversity on the board we observe that it is positively and significantly related to the performance of the financial firm.
Introduction
The wide acceptance that the board plays a vital role in determining corporate performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) does shift the focus, at different levels (community directives, national law, code of conduct), on this internal governance mechanism. As a result, rules and recommendations are issued according to which a well-governed company is one that has a board with an adequate board composition (executive, non-executive and independent director) and heterogeneity (board diversity), in other words, in which directors have different demographic characteristics (like gender and nationality) and task-diversity (skill, knowledge, network) . Board diversity became a central theme also in the area of research on corporate governance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Fairfax, 2005) but financial firms, owing to their special nature, are generally excluded from datasets to focus analysis only on non-financial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Haan and Vlahu, 2016) .
Governance concerns, however, affect the financial sector even more, despite being subjected to more stringent regulations than non-financial firms, considering that today it operates in an environment characterised by growing competition whose good internal governance choices (such as the choices related to board diversity) have become more important than ever before (Belkhir, 2009) . To this must be added that, as a consequence of the financial crisis, interest in the governance issue has increased because diversity on the board can be particularly valuable in critical situations, since it implies openness to different backgrounds, knowledge and points of view (Del Prete and Stefani, 2015) to grasp the new opportunities and managing the new context so as to prevent the failure of the organisation. In this context, the board of directors of financial organisations has become the object of attention of the Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions of the European Commission (2010) and of the Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance of the Basel Committee (2010), addressed to stressing the importance of an adequate mix of skills and points of view on boards, to benefit the quality of decision making and the effectiveness of the process of monitoring of conflict of interest, and to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (2013) that promotes the diversity of the intermediary management board.
Italy responded to these solicitations in two ways. Firstly, the Corporate Governance Committee updated the Code of Conduct (CGC, 2015) and recommended each listed firm should verify that the various members (executive, non-executive, independent) and that the professional and managerial skills, including international experience, be adequately represented, taking into account also the benefits that could stem from the presence of different genders, ages and seniority. Secondly, Italy introduced a quota law (L. 210/2011) for promoting gender equality of opportunities on the board, a very important step considering that Italy is a country which historically has had minimal female participation in the workforce.
On these bases, the primary objective of this study is to examine whether board diversity affected the performance of Italian financial institutions in the period 2011-2014. Better knowledge of how Italian financial institutions are governed is important to evaluate the recent changes in their governance structure and to know how their corporate governance affects their performance, especially considering that the period under analysis is characterised by financial crisis whereby it becomes important to know whether board diversity is able to contain the riskiness of the financial sector and prevent collapses.
The extant literature on board diversity concentrates almost exclusively on observable forms of diversity (gender and ethnicity/nationality) whereas this paper expands the existing analyses by controlling also for task-diversity. The performances are measured by Tobin's Q. The theoretical underpinning for this study includes agency theory and resource dependence theory. Agency theory is concerned with the relationship between the principal and the agents 1 . The principals are the shareholders while the agents are the executive managers of the firm. In the agency theory, the owner (shareholder) delegates the running of the business to an executive (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009) , therefore the shareholder expects the agent act and make decision in the principals' interests. On the contrary, the agent may not necessarily make decisions in the best interest of the principal, leading to an agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . There is, therefore, a need to reduce agency cost, which can be done by monitoring the activities of the executive directors. The diversity of the board of directors has, in this context, an important function (Garba and Abubakar, 2014) . The resource dependence theory, indeed, proposes that boards provide access to resources that are not otherwise available (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . In detail, when an organisation appoints a director to a board, it expects that the director with his competencies and individual features will come to support the organisation. Differences in gender, ethnicity/nationality and individual competencies will very likely produce unique information sets (board diversity) that are available to management for better decision making. According to this theory, the board is seen as asset of the firm contributing to sustained value creation (Hillman et al., 2009; Pugliese et al., 2014) . The integration of agency and resource dependence perspective can contribute to have a complete understanding of how board diversity affect firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) . Combining the two theories, coherently with Hillman and Dalziel (2003) , we hypothesise that board diversity likely facilitates the provision of resources and facilitates monitoring; suggesting that best practices for board diversity will positively influence board functioning and therefore firm performance. We test our hypotheses with OLS regression on pooled data (POLS). We measure board diversity with three of most used proxies in literature: the incidence of females on the board (gender diversity), the incidence of foreign directorship on the board (foreign diversity) and the interlocking directorship (task-diversity) articulated in board interlocking (directors on the board who serves another board) and busy directors (overload of work in other boards). To this we add overall measures of demographic board diversity that consider conjointly the presence of gender and foreign directors.
Our findings, coherently with the resource dependence theory, provide evidence that there is a significant and positive relationship between the incidence of foreign and performance, measured with Tobin's Q. Coherently with the agency theory, we find a significant and negative relationship between busy directors and firm performance. When we consider the overall demographic board diversity we can observe that board diversity has a significant and positive impact on firm performance. Firm performance is also impacted positively by interlocking and negatively by busy directorship.
Our study contributes to the literature in different ways. First, this paper contributes to research concerned with corporate governance and financial firms, a context to date poorly investigated with respect to non-financial firms, in which the need for a more diversified board is important to respond to the new demands coming from the market today and to combat most complex situations. Second we considered the firms that operate in the Italian Stock Exchange, with respect to which we found just one study focuses on more aspect of diversity (Schwizer et al., 2012) and two focuses on gender diversity (Romano et al., 2012; Del Prete and Stefani, 2015) and their results are mixed. Third, we consider the period from 2011 to 2014. The year 2011 is important because in this year a quota law (or gender law) was introduced in Italy that affected board diversity leading to an increase in the less represented gender, being surely female in Italy. Fourth, we respond to recent calls to consider the multiple dimension of diversity simultaneously (García-Meca et al., 2015) considering the effect of board diversity (demographic diversity; task-diversity and conjointly the demographic diversity, overall measures of diversity) on bank performance. Fifth, the paper enriches the existing literature by providing evidence on the individual components of board diversity and performance of the financial service firm and especially when there are more different subjects on the board at the same time (overall demographic diversity), that the firm's financial performance improves.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 investigates the literature on internal governance mechanisms and especially on board diversity and develops the hypotheses accordingly; Section 3 describes research methods; while Section 4 shows and discusses the results of the analysis; finally, in Section 5 are the conclusions.
Literature review
Board diversity, described as the variation among its members (Coffey and Wang, 1998) or the varied combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by individual directors (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003) , has recently caught the attention of managers, policymakers, directors, shareholders and academia as a key corporate governance concept (Johansen, 2008) .
The notion of board diversity can be analysed with reference to demographic characteristics (or personal attributes) like age, gender, ethnicity, nationality (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Erhardt et al., 2003; Fairfax, 2005; Rose, 2007; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) or in terms of task-diversity (like competencies, skill and background). Overall, there is board diversity when on the board there are several combinations of attributes.
There are several studies that analyse the relationship between diversity (various dimensions) and performance, much of these are focused upon one particular dimension of board diversity, most typically the incidence of females on the board (gender diversity), the incidence of foreign directorship (foreign diversity) and interlocking directorship (task-diversity). The results of these studies are mixed.
With regard to gender diversity, Carter et al. (2003) , Nguyen and Faff (2007) and Bronzetti et al. (2010) using Tobin's Q find a significant positive relationship between gender diversity and firm performance; similarly Dutta and Bose (2006) and Francoeur et al. (2008) highlighted that firms operating in complex environments generate positive and significant abnormal returns when they have a high proportion of female directors. Matsa and Miller (2013) , instead, find both positive and negative findings while the studies of van der Walt et al. (2006) , Rose (2007) , Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) , Carter et al. (2010) , Haslam et al. (2010) , Dobbin and Jung (2011) and Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011) find no effect or negative relationship between female directors and their performances. Also the study focuses on gender and performance in financial firms' highlighted mixed result (Table 1) . Romano et al. (2012) , Garba and Abubakar (2014) and García-Meca et al. (2015) reported a positive and significant relationship between gender diversity and financial firm performance. Pathan and Faff (2013) , instead, also find a positive impact of gender but this diminishes in both the post-SOX and the crisis periods. Del Prete and Stefani (2015) find that gender diversity can have a positive impact on the quality of credit and, to a lesser extent, on profitability but its merits further investigation while Hagendorff and Keasey (2012) , Wachudi and Mboya (2012) , Schwizer et al. (2012) and Liang et al. (2013) find no effect between female directors and their performances.
With regard the foreign directorship, Oxelheim and Randøy (2001) and Marimuthu (2008) , find a significant positive relationship between the presence of foreign directors on the board and firms' financial performance. Considering the studies focuses on the financial sector ( Table 1 ) we note that Garba and Abubakar (2014) find a positive and significant effect between the foreign director and firm performance while García-Meca et al. (2015) show that nationality diversity inhibits the bank performance and Schwizer et al. (2012) do not find a significant relationship.
The other dimension of diversity most used is the interlocking directorship. Interlocking occurs when "a person affiliated with one organisation sits on the board of directors of another organisation" (Mizruchi, 1996) . The consequences of interlocking directorates are different. A director who has many external board appointments is more likely to be distracted and potentially could compromise the quality of work of the focal company board (Kaczmarek et al., 2014) . At the same time, busy outside board members are important sources of knowledge and expertise, who are likely to enhance firm performance (Davis, 1991; Westphal et al., 2001; Ferris et al., 2003; Mazzotta, 2013; Haan and Vlahu, 2016) . Fich and Shivdasani (2006) , considering non-financial firms, find that firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance while Perry and Peyer (2005) and Di Pietra et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between interlocking and firm's performance. Pathan and Faff ( 
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Gender diversity has no significant effect on the performance of banks In other study (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006) , it does not appear to be any relationship between holding multiple directorships and firm financial performance. The busy director, therefore, can be a double-edged sword, apparently beneficial yet having negative implications when used excessively (Di Pietra et al., 2008; Kaczmarek et al., 2014) . The studies on the relationship between interlocking and firm performance reflect, in fact, mixed findings.
The results of studies that examined the relationship between interlocking and firm's performance with reference to the financial firms (Table 1 ) are also mixed. Liang et al. (2013) and Schwizer et al. (2012) find no significant relationship between interlocking and firm performance while Kaczmarek et al. (2014) provide evidence of a negative association between interlocking directorship and firm performance also if the effect of interlocking on firm performance is likely to be positive in the presence of board diversity.
Focusing our attention only on studies in the financial sector we can note that four of them consider just one dimension of diversity (gender) (Romano et al., 2012; Wachudi and Mboya, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Del Prete and Stefani, 2015) and six more diversity variables (Hagendorff and Keasey, 2012; Schwizer et al., 2012; Liang et al., 2013; Garba and Abubakar, 2014; Kaczmarek et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015) . The studies that consider more dimension of diversity (age, gender, foreign) insert in the same model. Only Kaczmarek et al. (2014) used an overall measure of board demographic diversity calculated using the Blau's index and considering such as dimension of diversity. These studies use different proxies of performance as Tobin's Q (Kaczmarek et al., 2014) , Cost of equity capital (Schwizer et al., 2012) , market reaction (Hagendorff and Keasey, 2012) or alternative performance measures among these ROA and/or ROE (Liang et al., 2013; Garba and Abubakar, 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015) . All considered, the findings are mixed and therefore inconclusive, but considering the agency theory and the resource dependence theory, we believe that gender, foreign and interlock diversity impact on a financial firm's performance.
To sum up, based on the above discussion, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1 Diversity dimensions (gender, foreign and interlock) are positively related to the performance of listed Italian financial firms.
The presence of female and foreign directors on the board itself does not ensure board diversity. A low presence of female and foreign directors, which we consider with special features, can lead to an unconscious socialisation of this, in other word they can be induced to adopt the ideas of the majority of conventional members, which entails that potential performance effects do not materialise (Rose, 2007) . At the same time the high presence of women or foreigners can actually show a high degree of homogeneity in terms of gender or nationality (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008) . The board of directors, instead, we believe must be characterised by diversity, or in other words, made up of directors with a varied combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise. Board heterogeneity is well considered also by the Italian Code of Conduct, which considers inter alia that a benefit to the action of the board comes from the presence of different genders, skills and of international professionalism. We refer to this diversity as board diversity. In other words, a board with an overall diversity likely has better performance. Therefore we posit that board diversity is beneficial to a financial firm's performance and the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2 Board diversity is positively related to the performance of listed Italian financial firms.
Research method

Sample and data collection
Our analysis is conducted with reference to financial institutions listed on the Italian Stock Exchange, belonging to the financial sector, in the period 2011-2014. The choice of sample has several motivations. We chose Italy because reforms in commercial law (1998, 2003 and 2005) and the introduction and update of a code of best practice (1999, 2002, 2006, 2011 and 2015) have contributed to radically change the Italian governance system also at board level, by encouraging among other things the transparency in the appointment of directors, demanding a larger proportion of non-executive and independent directors and recently demanding board diversity. In this context, to increase female participation, in July 2011, Italy, following the Norway example (Machold, 2013) , introduced the gender law (Law 120/2011), which imposed respect to gender quotas on firm boards and audit committees of listed firms. The quota is set at 20 percent for the first renewal and 33 percent for the next two. This rule directly affects board diversity of all listed firms, including those of the financial sector and makes an interesting analysis on the effect of the quota law over the period 2011-2014. For banks, this rule has become more stringent following the Capital Requirements Directive IV, Art. 91.11 (Directive 2013/36/EU) and with the push of Bank of Italy that encourages the diversity of the management bodies of banks with the invitation to financial intermediaries to adopt initiatives to promote greater female presence on their boards and requires a minimum of 20% female presence. The financial sector, finally, was chosen because it has a special nature with more stringent rules that can impact on board diversity to contrast collapses in the ongoing Italian financial crisis.
To select the sample, we start from the financial institutions listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. The Italian Stock Exchange includes in its financial sector 17 banks, seven insurance firms (both life and non-life insurance), eight real estates and 16 financial services sectors. The criteria followed for sample selection were the following: we took into consideration only those firms not banned by regulators and we eliminated the listed firms in which one or more key variables were missing.
Our sample therefore consisted of 45 firms (Table 2) , 16 of which belong to the banking sector (B), 7 to the insurance sector (I); 7 to real estates (RE) and 15 are in the financial service sector (FS). Owing to the amount of missing data the final sample consisted of 177 observations ( Table 2) .
The corporate governance data were retrieved from the Report on Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure and financial data were retrieved through use of a database (Datastream) as well as manually from the annual report of each listed firm.
Table 2
The sample selection process
No. of listed financial firms on the period 2011-2014 48 No. of firms with missing data
Final sample 45
No. of firms operating in banking sector 16
No. of firms operating in insurance sector 7
No. of firms operating in real estates sector 7
No. of firms operating in financial services sector 15
No. of observation 177
Variables measurement
Dependent variable
In order to test the hypotheses derived in the theoretical section we use a market-based measure of firm performance in the form of Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is frequently applied in the extant corporate governance literature (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Baghat and Bolton, 2008; Guest, 2009; Haslam et al., 2010) . Stock-based measures of performance, such as Tobin's Q, are relatively forward looking, in the sense that they reflect a firm's current position and also its potential to be successful in the future (Devers et al., 2007) and are more resistant to manipulation by management (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995) . Moreover, scholars find evidence that board composition has more effect for stock-based than for accounting-based measures of firm performance (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Haslam et al., 2010) . In the paper we measured Tobin's Q as equal to the market value of stock and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.
Independent variables
The independent variables used to explain the performance of financial institutions is diversity on the board of directors. We chose to analyse the board of an Italian financial firm considering demographic characteristics and task-diversity. With reference to demographic characteristics we chose to use gender and foreign diversity, two diversity dimensions frequently used in the research on the relationship between board diversity and performance because their presence contribute to differentiate the board.
Gender diversity on the board (GENDIV) is measured, consistent with the vast majority of research on this topic, as the percentage of female directors on the board of directors, without restriction to independent or executive female directors (Romano et al., 2012; Liang et al., 2013; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Garba and Abubakar, 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015) .
Foreign diversity on the board (FORDIV) is measured, coherently with literature (Schwizer et al., 2012; Liang et al., 2013; Garba and Abubakar, 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015) as a percentage of directors of non-Italian nationality.
The variable GENDIV and FORDIV are used to test hypothesis 1. Empirical studies present mixed result but we believe that gender diversity and foreign diversity could have a positive effect on firm performance. Gender diversity could have non-significant or anyway negative relationship to firm performance, if the presence of a female on the board is an answer to the requirements of law.
To test Hypothesis 2 we need to define a variable of overall board demographic diversity because the percentage of women or foreign directors may not be an appropriate measure of overall board diversity as the high presence of women or foreigners can actually show a high degree of homogeneity in terms of gender or nationality (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008) . To overcome this obstacle the Blau's index can be used (Blau, 1977) . The Blau's index is one of the most widespread diversity measures for categorical variables (Magjuka and Baldwin, 1991; Hambrick et al., 1996; Webber and Donahue, 2001; Bear et al., 2010; Joecks et al., 2012) . Previous studies (Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Baghat and Bolton, 2008) have empirically proved the existence of a positive relationship between corporate governance measured through index and value. The computation of the Blau's index is different from the proportion computation. The Blau's index considers all groups and does not pay attention to only one group. Hence, when the proportion of female members on the board of a firm is 100%, the index would be zero since the firm has no male members. In other words, the gender of its board members is totally homogeneous. The Blau's Index has a maximum value when the proportion of categories (gender or nationality) is at the maximum (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008) . The Blau's index is used to measure board demographic diversity and is calculated as follows: where i stands for the number of categories, two in the case of gender and foreigners, and s c is the fraction of female or foreigners on the board. The Blau's index ranges from 0 to a maximum of 0.5, H = 0 signifies complete homogeneity (all member are male or Italian) and H = 0.5 indicates complete heterogeneity (one half of all board members is female and other is male or one half of all board members is Italian and other is foreign). Having defined Blau's index for the two variables, we sum up to obtain an indicator that represents the overall demographic diversity in terms of female and foreign directors (GFDIVERSITY). The lowest diversity indicator value is zero and that the greatest is 1. When it assumes zero value it means that the board is perfectly homogenous and then consisting of only Italian men, when it takes on the value 1 the board is appropriately composed, presenting half women and foreign directors.
With regard to task-diversity we chose, as a proxy, the interlocking board directorate. In this study, we measure interlocking through two aspects: the board interlocking (BINT) and board busyness (BUSY). The measurement of BINT is defined as number of directors' interlocks on board size, to take into account the fact that larger board are naturally more likely to have more connection to other boards. BINT can range from zero to one. A score of zero means that all the directors of the company only sit on that one board. The value of one, instead, highlighted a greater connectedness of the board to other companies. BUSY is operationalised as the average number of firm directorships held by the all directors of that firm. The two measures are calculated at the level of the firm's board. We expect that BINT, in accordance with the resource dependence theory, will be positively associated with firm performance and BUSY, in accordance with the agency theory, will be negative because when used in excess it is probable that the director will not be able to devote sufficient time and energy to the firm board in question (Kaczmarek et al., 2014) .
Control variables
We included three control variables: firm size, firm age and leverage. Firm size (FIRMSIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, which is often found to have a significant effect on internal governance mechanisms. In detail, large size could produce worse performances due to organisation inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966 ) so we expected a negative relationship with firm performance. Firm age (FIRMAGE), following Drobetz et al. (2004) , is the natural logarithm of the years since quotation, This variable allows the experience of the firm on the capital market to be taken into account, therefore, a negative coefficient could be expected because more recently listed firms have been likely to be faster growing and perhaps more intangible asset-intensive (Black et al., 2006) . Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured as a long-term debt to total assets ratio. Based on the agency theory, a positive relationship between leverage and firm value could be expected this because higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to improvement in a firm's performance. Table 3 presents a summary of variables used in the paper. 
Method of data analysis and model specification
This study makes use of both descriptive and regression analysis. The descriptive analysis was executed to summarise and describe the data set while the regression analysis explains the effect of the corporate board diversity and other control variables on the financial firm's performance in the financial sector. The methodology employed to verify the research hypotheses was the econometric technique of OLS regressions on pooled data (POLS). This estimation method can be used on longitudinal data (i.e., observations on each firm are repeated over time) only if there are no individual effects. The Haussmann test for a comparison between the random effects estimator and the fixed effects estimator was made. The test generates a χ 2 with degrees of freedom and probability (p value). We found that the p value is less than 0.05, thus the null hypothesis was rejected, which indicates that ordinary least squares (OLS) should be used in this study. In order to overcome the econometric problem, often related to the OLS estimates, of the heteroscedasticity of residuals, we correct our estimates by using standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
To test our hypothesis we defined two models. The first model is used to test Hypothesis 1. In this model, we consider the four dimension of diversity separately in the same model. The theoretical model is given as: ( 1) where TOBINSQ, the dependent variable, is a performance measure; GENDIV and FORDIV are used to represent demographic characteristics and BUSY and BINT to represent interlocking board directorate. FIRMSIZE, FIRMAGE and LEVERAGE are control variables.
To test Hypothesis 2 we measure board diversity by board demographic diversity (joint incidence of female and foreign directors) and interlocking board directorate. The theoretical model is given as: 
where TOBINSQ, the dependent variable, is a performance measure; GFDIVERSITY is a synthetic measure of conjoint demographic diversity of female and foreigner on the board calculated on the basis of the Blau's index, as described in Section 3.2.2, while BUSY and BINT measure interlocking board directorate. FIRMSIZE, FIRMAGE and LEVERAGE are control variables.
Results and discussion
This section presents the descriptive and inferential results obtained from the study and the discussion on the basis of the literature.
Descriptive statistics
This subsection provides the descriptive results obtained from the study and will give us a better understanding of the data. Table 4 describes the data set for Italian financial firms, articulated by subsector. Firms examined are male-dominated ones, meaning that the incidence of male directors is greater than that of female directors: 86 per cent of directors in the sampled companies are male directors. Also foreign directors are little represented, just 6%. Therefore the board of Italian financial firms are characterised by a limited diversity. Each individual sub-sector presents a peculiarity (Table 4) . In detail, insurance firms are the ones which have a larger board of directors, on average 16.25 (median 15.5), women directors are on average 2.21 (and therefore 14.04 male directors) while foreigner directors are on average 0.82 (and therefore 15.43 Italian directors). Banking firms count, instead, 14.05 directors, women directors are in average 1.86 while foreigner directors are in average 1.06. Firms that operating in real estate sector have a board of, on average, 9.93 director, which are on average 1.67 women and 0.48 foreign directors. The financial services are less heterogeneous, with an average of 1.25 women and 0.56 foreigners present on the board.
The board size is closely correlated with company size, in fact, the banks and insurance companies in our sample, organisations with higher firm size, have a board that is larger than the boards of companies in the other sector (Table 4) . This is also explained in the literature which argues, in fact, that the greater size of the company is also an expression of major corporate complexity and, therefore, more different skills are required for its management.
Directors, on average, have other, considering all samples, appointments in 72% of cases. The directors of the RE are positioned below the average, 67% of directors. Moreover, directors, considering all samples, sitting on average on 4.17 other boards. Note the load of the directors of RE and FS, indicating that the directors have many tasks to handle, in detail, respectively, 5.55 and 4.61 average duties.
The larger firms are those belonging to subsector I and B while the older firms are those belonging to sector B and RE. The Tobin's Q has a total average of 0.89, the highest value is observed with reference to the FS enterprises.
Summing up, insurance and banking firms are those that have a more differentiated board with respect to financial services and real estate companies. Figure 1 proposes the evolution of the presence of female and foreign directors on the board for each year of analysis. With regard to women it is observed that there has been an evolution in the period from 2011 to 2014. In particular, it shows an increase in the presence of women on the board. The percentage of women on boards (GENDIV) of financial firms, in 2014, on average is 21.82% while in 2011 the female on the board was 3.89%. The percentage of women on the board of directors has grown considerably from 2011 onwards in all sub-sectors to achieve an average above 14% of the board. This result is a direct consequence of the application of the quota law. Despite this increase, firms have a long way to go before achieving gender parity, what can be glimpsed is the role often attributed to women within the board (usually independent or non-executive directors). Considering the data for the subsector we can observe that in 2014 all subsectors have on their board at least 20% of women. The greatest growth has taken place in the banking sector; the incidence of women is, in fact, increased from 2.76% in 2011 to 21.27 of 2014. The rise of women is relevant but should be read considering that previously bank board was characterised by very few women on the bank board (Tarantola and Magliocco, 2007; ABI, 2011; Del Prete and Stefani, 2015) and the gender gap for Italian bank was wide in comparison with other economic sectors nationwide (Bellavigna and Zavanella, 2010) .
In 2014, the boards with the greatest female representation are those of the insurance sector, with an average of 25.11% of the board. In any case, few compared to the entire board of directors before the board can be considered heterogeneous.
The presence of foreigners (FORDIV) is slightly decreasing (Figure 1 ). It varies from 6.30% registered in 2011 to 5.47% in 2014. The greatest decrease of foreign directors is observed with reference to the insurance companies, for these companies we observe a reduction of the size of the board and of the number of foreigners in favour of the number of women for 2014, in other words, the board has been reorganised and in the place of foreign directors, women directors have been appointed. This result makes us think that the increase in the number of women is due both in response to regulatory demands rather than to the real need for diversity. The demands, in fact, are for board diversity not just with reference to females and therefore this also applies to the presence of people of other nationalities, which, however, carries substantially the same weight in all the years examined. As shown in Table 5 , there are no correlations between independent variables that reach 0.85. However, a certain degree of multicollinearity can still be a concern, even where the bivariate correlation coefficients are low. Hence, the presence of multicollinearity is also examined through estimation of the variance inflation factor (VIF). The correlation analysis, coherently with Ferris et al. (2003) , highlighted that the phenomenon of multiple interlocking directorates occurs predominantly in large firms. The negative correlation between GENDIV and BINT highlighted that women, most likely tend to have fewer positions in other board. Contrarily the foreign directors tend to have other busy directors on other boards. There is a significant relationship between firm size and firm age and between female and foreign directors with firm size and firm age. These results indicate that older enterprises are also larger ones, and in these the presence of women and foreigners are most welcomed.
Regression analysis
This subsection deals with inferential analysis of data, this is because generalisation cannot be made with only descriptive results. Table 6 shows the estimated results for the proposed model 1 in order to explain the role of different proxies of board diversity on firm's performance. Tobin's Q is used as measure of the firm's performance. The adjusted R 2 , reported in Table 6 , shows that approximately 36% of the variation in the Tobin's Q in Italian financial firms can be explained when we include four board diversity variables. We report also the beta coefficients in order to compare the relative strength of the various predictors within the model. Since the beta coefficients are all measured in standard deviations, instead of the units of the variables, they can be compared to one another to assess the relative strength of each of the predictors. The largest VIF is 1.22, thus, there is no evidence of a serious multicollinearity problem being present in the regression model.
The findings shows that in the Italian financial firms the presence of women is not related significantly to firm performance, coherently Wachudi and Mboya (2012) , Schwizer et al. (2012) and Liang et al. (2013) . In addition, gender diversity coefficient is negative, whereby the female director has a negative effect on firm performance, this result could be interpreted as a reflection of the investor's stereotypic beliefs about women's lack of adequate competence (Haslam et al., 2010) . These results suggest that mandating gender quotas for directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009 ). This result is not consistent with the agency theory that suggests that gender-diverse boards are more likely to make an effort in monitoring.
Table 6
Results of the regression model 1 With reference to the presence of foreign directorships, coherently with Oxelheim and Randøy (2001) , Marimuthu (2008) and Garba and Abubakar (2014) but contrary to those of Schwizer et al. (2012) and García-Meca et al. (2015) , we find a significant and positive coefficient. The result shows that Tobin's Q increase of 0.751 for every one-unit increase in foreign, assuming that all other variables in the model are held constant. There is the largest beta coefficient, with regard to foreign diversity variables. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in foreigners leads to a 0.191 standard deviation increase in predicted Tobin's Q, with the other variables held constant. This result is in line with the agency theory that suggests that foreign-diverse boards are more likely to make an effort in monitoring.
With regard to the variables used to represent board interlocking our results reveal that BINT, coherently with the resource dependence theory and as expected, is positively and significantly associated with firm performance at 5% level of confidence. This means that the increase in the number of directors on a board that can provide the knowledge and skills from other assignments will most likely improve performance. The beta coefficient show that, a one standard deviation increase in BUSY leads to a 0.138 standard deviation decrease in predicted Tobin's Q with the other variables in the model held constant.
With reference to BUSY, coherently with Kaczmarek et al. (2014) , we obtained a significant and negative coefficient. This suggests that when the level of interlocking is high the need to reconcile a number of board appointments compromises directors' ability to contribute sufficient time and attention (Perry and Peyer, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) . This result is in line with the agency theory which points to the problem of busyness rather than the resource dependence theory which suggests the benefit of interlocking in terms of improved inter-organisational coordination (Kaczmarek et al., 2014) . The beta coefficient show that, a one standard deviation increase in Busy leads to a 0.156 standard deviation decrease in predicted Tobin's Q with the other variables in the model held constant.
Control variables are all statistically significant and coherently with literature we find that FIRMSIZE and FIRMAGE impact negatively on Tobin's Q and that LEVERAGE affect positively Tobin's Q.
In a non-tabulated result we obtained the same result using the regression as an alternative measurement of gender diversity and foreign diversity, using the Blau's index for female directors and for foreign directors. Table 7 shows the result of the regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2, and therefore model 2. Tobin's Q is used as measure of the firm's performance. In this case, we want to test if board diversity (and therefore characterised by the simultaneous presence of foreign and female directors and with directors with different task-diversity) affects the company's performance. The adjusted R 2 , reported in Table 7 , shows that approximately 35% of the variation in Tobin's Q in Italian financial firms can be explained when we consider the overall demographic board diversity (joint presence of female and foreign directors on the same board) measured by the Blau's index and interlocking of directors (BINT and BUSY). The F-test is statistically significant, this signifies that the model (the predictors) did a good job of predicting the outcome variable and that there is a significant relationship between the set of predictors and the dependent variable. The largest VIF is 1.21, thus, there is no evidence of a serious multicollinearity problem being present in the regression model. Our findings show that in Italian financial firms the board gender and foreign overall diversity (GFDIVERSITY) is significantly and positively related to firm performance. The beta coefficient show that, a one standard deviation increase in GFDIVERSITY leads to a 0.112 standard deviation increase in predicted Tobin's Q with the other variables in the model held constant. This is a very important result that could also affect future choices, a board that contains both more women and foreigners is a board that works well and has a positive effect on company performance. This result seems to emphasise that the negative impact that might come from having entered the women within the board as a result of the quota law, is moderated by the presence of foreigner's directors and by more female directors. In other words, the presence of more directors with an unconventional background prevents the socialisation at the ideas of the majority of conventional board members, which entails a positive effect on firm performance (Rose, 2007) . Our results highlighted, therefore, that the presence of female and foreign directors on the board does not, in itself, affect firm value what is decisive is the overall demographic diversity it, in fact, has a positive impact on firm value. This implies that the most important focus for Italian bank should be the balance between female and foreign directors with male and Italian directors. The beta coefficient, moreover, shows that the variables of diversity have more impact on Tobin's Q than BINT. This result indicates that the greater the number of directors who have other assignments, and therefore can provide knowledge acquired elsewhere, the better the performance. As expected, instead, the busy directors on other boards negatively affect performance, this is because sustaining a heavy workload, and you cannot manage well. This result is coherent with Perry and Peyer (2005) , Fich and Shivdasani (2006) , Di Pietra et al. (2008) , Kaczmarek et al. (2014) and with our expectation. Control variables are all statistically significant and coherently with literature we find that FIRMSIZE and FIRMAGE impact negatively on Tobin's Q and that LEVERAGE affect positively Tobin's Q.
Conclusions
This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firm performance of financial firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. Board diversity is focused on different items: the percentage of women on the board, the presence of directors of other nationalities and interlocking directors in other firms. Consistent with prior findings for financial firms, we find there is a significant relationship between the incidence of foreign director and Tobin's Q, while gender diversity does not have a statistically significant relationship with Tobin's Q. If we consider, instead, a joint diversity of female and foreign directors (measured by the Blau's index) we find a statistically significant positive relationship between board demographic diversity and firm performance. Also the presence of interlocking directorship shows a statistically and significant positive relationship with firm's performance. This result highlighted that the board with an overall demographic diversity and with an interlocking diversity has better performance. Results suggest that coherently with resource dependence theory, diversity holds the potential to improve information provided by the board to a manager due to the unique information held by diverse directors.
The analysis has limits that can be the basis for future research. A first limit is linked to the a priori decision to consider only the quantitative aspects of the problem which has led to considering only the presence of heterogeneity within the board and not the role and contribution to the effective functioning of the board thanks to diversity. This entails a risk of box ticking since the presence of heterogeneity in itself does not provide the certainty of effective functioning of the board. A second limitation is related to the mode of defining the nationality of the directors, identified according to place of birth (Italian or foreign) of the same. In fact, there can be directors who are Italian by birth but who substantially contribute as a foreign director. A third limit is connected to the way the interlocking occurs since the same does not take into account the type of position (executive, non-executive) on other boards and therefore the time that such other duties can take away. Another limit derives from having excluded some less directly observable variables (such as knowledge, skills and abilities). Future research could therefore look at:
1 better identification of the nationalities of the other directors 2 take into account the number and type of other positions 3 go beyond the superficiality of demographic characteristics, for example, analysing the background, knowledge and experiences of directors 4 expand the analysis in substantial longitudinal dimension through which we can detect effects of changes in board composition.
Finally, the managerial implication of our study indicates that board diversity is an important pre-requisite for constructing a well functioning and value creating board. Our results show that the board needs more diversity; heterogeneous boards are those that likely lead to better performance. The main result is that there are not enough women or foreigners as the simultaneous presence of both, separately considering the presence of women in the board appears to have a negative impact on performance but if on the same board of directors there are women and foreign directors the impact on performance becomes positive. These results justify the fact that diversity should be further promoted, by contemporary regulation and are even more incisive in the soft law (code of conduct).
